

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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FM US SCC GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 014

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 US SCC GENEVA 5145

EXDIS/SCC

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S SCC STATEMENT (SCC II-003)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE BY COMMISSIONER
GRAYBEAL AT FIRST MEETING OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE
SCC, SEPTEMBER 27, 1973.

I

MR. COMMISSIONER, I WOULD LIKE TO AFFIRM THAT THE U.S.
COMPONENT OF THE SCC IS READY TO CONTINUE THE IMPORTANT WORK WHICH
WE BEGAN DURING THE FIRST SCC SESSION. OUR PRIMARY PURPOSE DURING
THIS SECOND SESSION IS TO REACH AGREEMENT OF PROCEDURES GOVERNING
REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR
COMPONENTS. OF COURSE, EITHER SIDE MAY, AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE,
RAISE ANY OTHER ISSUES WHICH FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SCC
RESPONSIBILITIES.

II

THE U.S. COMPONENT BELIEVES THAT AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURES
CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS NOT
ONLY NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THOSE AGREEMENTS, BUT WOULD ALSO
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FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC ARMS, AS WELL AS TO THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF
MUTUAL TRUST AND IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

THE JOINT DRAFT TEXTS, WHICH WERE WORKED OUT BY THE KARPOV-FITZGERALD WORKING GROUP AND PRESENTED AD REFERENDUM TO SCC COMMISSIONERS, HAVE BEEN GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY, AND I CONSIDER THEM TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

THE BRACKETED PORTIONS OF THOSE TEXTS REFLECT THE DIFFERING VIEWS ON WHICH WE WILL BE FOCUSING OUR ATTENTION. IN ADDITION, EACH SIDE MAY PROPOSE CHANGES IN THE UNBRACKETED PORTIONS THEREOF. I PROPOSE THAT, IN WORKING OUT THESE PROCEDURES, WE WORK AD REFERENDUM TO GOVERNMENTS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL ALL IS AGREED.

III

THE SCC HAS BEEN CHARGED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WITH WORKING OUT PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLING OF ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS AND STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT WILL PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT. UNILATERAL ACTIONS BY EITHER SIDE IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREED PROCEDURES MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE. ALSO, ANY REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES TAKEN BY EITHER SIDE PRIOR TO AGREEMENT ON THESE PROCEDURES CAN NOT PREDETERMINE THE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED, NOR CAN THEY SERVE AS A PRECEDENT PREJUDICIAL TO THE NEGOTIATION OF SUCH PROCEDURES.

IV

AS I NOTED EARLIER, THE BRACKETED PORTIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXTS PRESENTED AD REFERENDUM TO SCC COMMISSIONERS ON JULY 5, 1973, DELINEATE THE ISSUES RAISED DURING THE FIRST SESSION ON WHICH WE WERE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. AMONG THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES ARE PRIOR NOTIFICATION, THE DEGREE TO WHICH ICBM LAUNCHERS-- BOTH SOFT AND SILO--ARE TO BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED, THE DEGREE TO WHICH SLBM LAUNCHERS ARE TO BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED, AND
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ACCUMULATION OF SSBNS IN A CONSTRUCTION STATUS.

V

ON MAY 26, 1972, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS REACHED ACCORD THAT THE SCC WOULD AGREE ON PROCEDURES FOR THE DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF OLDER TYPES OF ICBM LAUNCHERS DEPLOYED PRIOR TO 1964 AND BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON OLDER SUBMARINES BEING REPLACED BY NEW SLBM LAUNCHERS ON MODERN SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS ON PROCEDURES FOR THE TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF SUCH DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION. THE U.S. COMPONENT BELIEVES THAT THE "TIMELY" NOTIFICATION CALLED FOR BY AGREED STATEMENT K REQUIRES THAT THE SIDES NOTIFY EACH OTHER OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATED TO PLANNED DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION AND

REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES AT SOME POINT IN TIME PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF SUCH ACTIONS.

VI

SOME OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES RELATE TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT ARE TO BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED. THE U.S. SIDE REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES TO BE AGREED BETWEEN US SHOULD RESULT IN CLEAR EVIDENCE--VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS--THAT REPLACED ICBM FACILITIES HAVE BEEN DEACTIVATED AND THAT THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THEIR REACTIVATION WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION.

THERE ARE SIMILAR ISSUES RELATED TO SLBM LAUNCHERS AND THEIR SUBMARINES.

VII

ANOTHER AREA WHERE WE NEED TO REACH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IS RELATED TO THE NUMBER OF REPLACEMENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH EITHER SIDE MAY HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION SIMULTANEOUSLY. THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT THIS NUMBER SHOULD NOT EXCEED A NORMAL CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE, WHICH, IN MY VIEW, MEANS A SCHEDULE CONSISTENT WITH PAST AND PRESENT CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES ON EACH SIDE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 US SCC GENEVA 5145

EXDIS/SCC

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE U.S. SIDE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO AGREE ON A SPECIFIC PROCEDURE WHICH WOULD BE CONSONANT WITH THIS GUIDELINE; A SPECIFIC PROCEDURE WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SSBNS WHICH HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED BUT HAVE NOT BEGUN SEA TRIALS WOULD EFFECTIVELY ENSURE THAT NEITHER SIDE IS EXCEEDING A NORMAL SCHEDULE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF REPLACEMENT SSBNS.

VIII

TO DATE, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE DETAILED PROCEDURES WHICH THE U.S. COMPONENT PROPOSED FOR THE REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS. I HOPE THAT THE SOVIET COMPONENT IS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS, AND THAT WE CAN NOW WORK ON BOTH DOCUMENTS IN PARALLEL.

IX

MR. COMMISSIONER, I BELIEVE THAT THE WORKING PROCEDURES WHICH WE DISCUSSED ON TUESDAY PROVIDE A SUITABLE BASIS TO PROCEED WITH OUR WORK. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD TODAY.

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MR. COMMISSIONER, IN SUMMARY, I WANT TO REEMPHASIZE THE U.S. COMPONENT'S READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS. BY CONTINUING OUR FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE EXCHANGES AT ALL LEVELS, I BELIEVE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN OUR ENDEAVOR, AND THAT, BY REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURES CALLED FOR BY THE ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT, WE WILL MAKE A NECESSARY CONTRIBUTION TO OUR ASSIGNED TASK OF PROMOTING THE OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE TWO AGREEMENTS, AS WELL AS ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITY FOR ANY FUTURE AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. MOREOVER, I FEEL THAT, AS A RESULT, THE SCC WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND TO IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM.
GRAYBEAL

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